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1 Introduction
At a banquet of the National Union of Conservative and Constitutional Asso-
ciations in June of 1872, Benjamin Disraeli made the following remarks on the
thinking behind the Reform Act of 1867, which had substantially increased the
number of British males with the right to vote:
That act was founded on a confidence that the great body of the
people of this country were “Conservative.” I use the word in its
purest and loftiest sense. I mean that the people of England, and
especially the working classes of England, are proud of belonging
to a great country, and wish to maintain its greatness—that they
are proud of belonging to an Imperial country, and are resolved
to maintain, if they can, the empire of England [. . . ] (cited in the
Times, June 25, 1872).
In short, Disraeli believed more inclusive suffrage would help sustain and
possibly expand the British empire.
The 1867 reform was a part of the larger transformation in which, dur-
ing the 19th and 20th centuries, western nations more generally extended the
right to vote to previously disenfranchised groups. In this paper we argue that
this extension can be explained as a rational commitment to higher defense
expenditure in the face of the threat of international conflict.
In a seminal contribution, Meltzer and Richard [46] argued that the growth
in government expenditure during the past two centuries could be explained
by successive franchise extensions. This argument depends on two observa-
tions. One, that income distributions typically have the property that me-
dian income is lower than average income. Two, that the extension of fran-
chise was generally in the direction of including lower-income citizens, which
would further lower the median income in the voting population. Meltzer and
Richard assume a government that only redistributes income. Since the tax
cost of redistributive measures is then lower for the voter of median income
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than for the voter of average income, the median voter would tend to demand
more redistribution.
The Meltzer-Richard argument raises the question of why the incumbent
elite would choose to extend the franchise, since it would seem to make them
worse off. A new, lower-income median voter would demand more transfers
than preferred by the incumbent median voter. Hence an extension of fran-
chise in a closed redistributive state would tend to hurt incumbents. So unless
one wishes to attribute altruistic motives to incumbents, franchise extension
becomes problematic. To deal with this, the literature has proposed a series
of theories that explain franchise extension based on, among others, a threat
of revolution (Acemoglu and Robinson [2, 3]), moral hazard in war (Ticchi and
Vindigni [60]), incentives of politicians (Lizzeri and Persico [41]), and conflicts
of interest within the elite (Llavador and Oxoby [42]). We discuss these theo-
ries in detail in Section 5, arguing that none of them is fully convincing in light
of the historical evidence.
In this paper, in contrast, we propose a theory of franchise extension based
on the argument that when tax revenues can be spent on military capacity
so as to augment a country’s power in international relations, extending the
franchise may function as a way for an incumbent elite to rationally commit to
higher defense expenditure. In addition to the theoretical argument for why
this should be the case, we provide a detailed historical analysis that supports
this account.
The theoretical argument runs along the following lines. Consider an econ-
omy in which the only good provided by government is defense, financed by
a uniform linear tax on income. The size of defense spending relative to that
of other nations determines the size of the territory controlled by the nation,
which is a good valued by its citizens. Suppose all nations are democracies,
and that the median voter theorem holds (e.g., because of two-party compe-
tition). Then a nation with a relatively lower median to mean income ratio
among the enfranchised spends relatively more on defense in equilibrium,
since the less the median voter earns compared to the average voter, the lower
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is his tax cost of an increase in defense spending. Suppose initially a rich elite
controls the government. In certain cases, it may be in the strategic interest
of the elite to extend the voting franchise to lower-income citizens. This is
because a median voter of lower income demands a larger defense budget,
commitment to which would be desirable from the point of view of the origi-
nal incumbent median voter because of its strategic effect on the behavior of
opponent nations. Extending the franchise can therefore have the effects of
strategic delegation.1 In particular, we note that the incumbent elite of a hege-
monic nation, in the sense of one that is already among the militarily superior
nations, has an incentive to extend the franchise, as this has the strategic effect
of making opponents reduce their defense expenditure.
The theory also implies that more democratic nations should spend rel-
atively more on military capacity. And, indeed, empirically there is a signif-
icant positive correlation between a country’s military strength and its de-
gree of democracy. Roughly speaking, powerful countries are democratic and
weak countries are autocratic. To see this, one can measure a country’s de-
gree of democracy by the Polity IV index (which scores from 10 to -10), and
a country’s military strength by its military expenditure in US dollars (SIPRI,
2012). The military alliance NATO, whose 28 members are highly democratic
(all Polity IV scores above 8 in 2012, with average 9.53), has a military budget of
around 990 billion dollars, which is approximately 60% of the world’s military
expenditure. Among NATO members, the United States alone is responsible
for 40% of the world’s expenditures, and the European Union for 15%. China,
which is among the least democratic countries (Polity IV score -7), has a mil-
itary budget of around 10%, and Russia, only slightly more democratic than
China (Polity IV score 4), has around 5%. All other countries each have less
than 5%.2
From a historical perspective, the implications of our theory explain par-
ticularly well the three central franchise extensions of the United Kingdom,
1For more on strategic delegation in conflict situations, see, e.g., Wärneryd [61].
2For more on democratic militarism, see Caverley [19].
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which coincide with the stages of British colonial expansion in the 19th cen-
tury. In the late 19th century, we see similar developments in France and the
United States. Many countries extended the franchise after World War I, but
while those that attempted to acquire international power became autocratic
within a decade (i.e., Italy, Germany, and Japan), the hegemonic powers, the
UK and the US, maintained and further developed their democracies, which
helped them be successful in World War II. The last franchise extension we
consider took place in the US in the 1960s and 70s and coincided with the
Cold War, which eventually ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union and
US supremacy. We except from consideration the democratic reforms in Ger-
many, Italy, and Japan after WWII, as they were largely imposed by the winning
powers.
On a methodological level, a novel theoretical contribution of this paper
is that we analyze what determines participation in a nation-state’s collec-
tive decision-making when the nation interacts strategically with other na-
tions. We build, on the one hand, on the recent literature dealing with the
strategic analysis of conflict (see, e.g., Hirshleifer [37], Skaperdas [57], Wärn-
eryd [62, 63, 64]), and, on the other, on the literature on the political deter-
mination of government spending (see, e.g., Meltzer and Richard [46] for the
seminal contribution or Persson and Tabellini [48] for a survey).
In a broader sense, this paper also contributes to the literature on the “demo-
cratic peace” hypothesis, which explores the relationship between the occur-
rence of war across countries and their democratic institutions. Lake [40],
Fearon [27], Garfinkel [31], De Mesquita et al [16], and Conconi et al [20] are
some examples from this literature. One crucial difference between these con-
tributions and ours is that we abstract from analyzing the occurrence of war,
while focusing on the determination of military expenditures under the threat
of international conflict.3 The core idea is that many aspects of international
3Among others, papers that focus on various mechanisms that determine the occurrence
of war are Bester and Wärneryd [12], Gartzke [32], Sanchez-Pages [55], Martin et al [44], and
Caselli et al [18].
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relations consist in bargaining situations that, in one way or another, are gov-
erned by relative military strength due to the implicit threat of war. So, inde-
pendently of the success or failure of such bargaining efforts (which may or
may not lead to war), military strength defines a country’s bargaining power
in international relations and therefore its relative gains. From a historical
perspective, we note that the early franchise extensions in the United King-
dom, France and the United States occurred in the 19th century, a period that
is well-known for the relatively scarce outbreaks of military conflict between
the leading nations (the Crimean War being one of the few exceptions). Nev-
ertheless, these nations were engaging in intense bargaining for colonial ex-
pansion, and such bargaining occurred under the not-so-implicit threat of a
global war that would ultimately materialize in WWI.
2 Defense spending in democracies
We consider n ≥ 2 countries in potential conflict. In country c ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}
live a continuum of risk neutral individuals of total mass 1. Individuals dif-
fer only with respect to their initial endowments wc i , which are distributed
according to the cumulative distribution function F c supported on R+.
The potential conflict among the countries concerns control of territory,
or land, the total value of which we normalize to 1. Out of the value of the
share of the land controlled by country c , citizen i gets an individual share
σc (wc i ), potentially dependent on income, with
∫
σc (w )dF c (w ) = 1.
The share of land controlled4 by country c , given military capacity levels
x1, x2, . . . , xn , is p
c (x1, x2, . . . , xn ), with
∑
c p
c = 1. We assume the conflict tech-
nology p c is a strictly increasing and strictly concave function of own capacity.
Assuming symmetry, p c is then convex in the capacity of any given opponent.
4We shall consider only a nation’s arming decision, and abstract from the decision to go
to war against other nations or not. We think of the share of the contested resource deter-
mined by the conflict technology as belonging to a nation as the share that could, potentially
or actually, be successfully defended by the nation.
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In country c , the military production function xc = µc sc , where µc > 0,
governs how military spending sc is transformed into military capacity. Mili-
tary spending is financed out of a nondistortionary, uniform linear tax tc on
initial endowments under a balanced-budget restriction.
The expected utility of individual i in country c is then
uc i := (1− tc )wc i +p c (x1, x2, . . . , xn )σc (wc i ).
Define yc =
∫
w dF c (w ), per capita income in country c . Since this number
will turn out to have no special significance for the phenomena we wish to
focus on here, we shall for simplicity assume that we have y1 = y2 = . . . = yn = 1.
Hence, under the budget balance assumption, we may write individual utility
as
uc i (x1, x2, . . . , xn ) = (1− (xc /µc ))wc i +p c (x1, x2, . . . , xn )σc (wc i ).
An optimal strictly positive level of military capacity xc from the point of view
of individual i in country c , given the military capacities of other countries, is
then defined by the first-order condition
−wc i
µc
+p cc (xc , . . .)σc (wc i ) = 0,
where p cc is the first partial derivative of p
c with respect to xc .
We hence have that
∂ xc
∂ wc i
=
(1/µc )−p cc σ′c
p cc cσc
,
where σ′c is the first derivative of σc . The individually optimal xc is therefore
declining in income ifσ′c is zero or small on the relevant interval. Consider, as
an example, an economy where the incumbent elite gets almost all of the value
of the land, while the rest is split equally among the poorer citizens. Then σ′c
is zero almost everywhere. In the following, we shall assume this holds, and,
to simplify notation, we shall setσc (w ) = 1 for all w .
The optimal xc is then strictly declining in wc i , so that ideal military ca-
pacities are inversely ordered by initial endowments in each country. The
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level of military capacity preferred by the individual with the median initial
endowment among the enfranchised, or more generally among what Bueno
de Mesquita et al [17] call the selectorate, the group of citizens who get to in-
fluence political decisions, is therefore a Condorcet winner or unbeatable pol-
icy.5
In international equilibrium, military capacities will be
1. the political equilibrium military capacities within in each country, i.e.,
those preferred by the respective incumbent median voters, and
2. best replies against each other.
Suppose, for example, that there are only two nations, 1 and 2, and that the
equilibrium military capacity in each country is that preferred by the median
enfranchised voter m . Then in an interior international equilibrium, military
capacities will satisfy
−w1m
µ1
+p 11 (x1, x2) = 0 (1)
and
−w2m
µ2
−p 12 (x1, x2) = 0. (2)
In particular, if the countries are identical, in the sense of having the same
income distribution and military production technology, there will be a sym-
metric equilibrium, where defense spending is the same in both countries.
Differentiating the best-reply conditions (1) and (2) with respect to w1m
and solving the resultant set of equations we find that
∂ x1
∂ w1m
=
p 122
(p 122p
1
11− (p 112)2)
5We might also consider the ideal policy of an autocrat who has an encompassing in-
terest, in the sense of McGuire and Olson [45], in the economy. Such a ruler consumes
some fixed share 0 < r ≤ 1 of the economy’s wealth, and hence has utility r (yc − (xC /µc ) +
p c (x1, x2, . . . , xn )). The autocrat’s first-order condition for an optimal xc is then−(1/µc )+p cc =
0—i.e., the autocrat’s preferences are the same as those of a citizen of mean income in a
democracy. An autocracy would therefore spend less on military capacity than would a
democracy, something which also appears to be the case empirically (see, e.g., Reiter and
Stam [53]).
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and
∂ x2
∂ w1m
=
p 112
(p 122p
1
11− (p 112)2) . (3)
Notice that since the conflict technology is symmetric, i.e., since p 1(x1, x2) =
1−p 1(x2, x1), we must have p 112(x1, x2) =−p 121(x2, x1) =−p 112(x2, x1). Hence if we
have x1 = x2, it must be the case that p 112(x1, x2) = 0. Consider now a situation
where the countries are identical, and in symmetric equilibrium, and decrease
w1m . We then see that in the new equilibrium country 1, the country with a
lower median income, will have the larger defense budget.
Consider now the equilibrium utility of citizen i in country 1 as a function
of the income of the median voter in country 1. It is
u1i (w1m ) := (1− (x1(w1m )/µ1))w1i +p 1(x1(w1m ), x2(w1m )).
Differentiating with respect to w1m , we see that
∂ u1i (w1m )
∂ w1m
= (−(w1i/µ1) +p 11 ) ∂ x1∂ w1m +p
1
2
∂ x2
∂ w1m
.
In particular, suppose citizen i is the median voter himself. Then the first term
is zero by optimality, and the sign of the derivative with respect to the median
voter’s income will, from (3), be determined by the sign of p 112. In general, if
the median voters of the two countries have different incomes, we will have
p 112 6= 0. In these cases there are other individuals who the median voter of
country 1 would prefer to himself as decision-makers regarding military ca-
pacity. Because of the strategic effect on the military spending of country 2,
there is an incentive for commitment or delegation. In the following we shall
show how this incentive can explain franchise extension.
3 Franchise extension
In the following, we shall assume that the conflict technology has the more
specific form
p c (x1, x2, . . . , xn ) :=
§
xc /X if X > 0
1/n otherwise,
9
where X :=
∑
k xk .
6
Define w˜c i := wc i/µc , and let wc m be the income of the incumbent median
voter in country c . In an interior international equilibrium7 it must then hold
for each c that
xc = X − w˜c m X 2. (4)
Summing over c , we get that
X =
∑
c
xc = n X −X 2
∑
c
w˜c m ,
and hence that
X =
n −1
W˜
, (5)
where W˜ :=
∑
c w˜c m .
The ratio of the equilibrium shares of the resource pool controlled by two
countries c and c ′, or their relative power, is therefore
p c (x1, x2, . . . , xn )
p c ′(x1, x2, . . . , xn )
=
1− w˜c m ((n −1)/W˜ )
1− w˜c ′m ((n −1)/W˜ ) .
Hence, in particular, if all countries are equally efficient in converting spend-
ing into military capacity, a country with a relatively lower median voter in-
come has relatively greater power in equilibrium. We shall call a country with
the greatest power hegemonic. More generally, we have the following.
Proposition 1 A country with a relatively lower w˜c m has relatively greater power
in equilibrium.
Assume that all countries have the same income distribution, and that in
every country there is a threshold income w¯c such that a citizen i has the right
6This particular specification of the conflict technology has a long pedigree, going back
at least to Haavelmo’s [35] discussion of international conflict. Also see Hirshleifer [36] and
Skaperdas [58].
7An interior equilibrium exists if the w˜c m are sufficiently close to each other, in a sense
which can be made precise, or if there are only two countries in potential conflict. We shall
assume throughout that one of these is the case.
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to vote if and only if wc i ≥ w¯c . Then wc m may be seen as a measure of the de-
gree of democracy of a country, in the sense that a lower wc m corresponds to
a larger franchise. If all countries have the same level of military technology, it
must then also be the case that the country with the greatest degree of democ-
racy is hegemonic.
Consider now the equilibrium utility of citizen i of country c when the
level of military spending is that preferred by citizen m . It is
uc i (w˜c m ) = wc i +

1− w˜c m n −1
W˜

1− w˜c i n −1
W˜

.
We have that
∂ uc i (w˜c m )
∂ w˜c m
=
n −1
W˜ 2

w˜c i

1− w˜c m n −1
W˜

− (W˜ − w˜c m )

1− w˜c i n −1
W˜

.
If this derivative is negative, the citizen would be strictly better off if the me-
dian voter had lower income. In the following we shall mean by franchise
extension a reform such that citizens of lower income than the currently en-
franchised are given the right to vote, thus lowering the income of the enfran-
chised voter of median income.
Since we have that
∂ uc i (w˜c m )
∂ w˜c m∂ w˜c i
=− (n −1)(2(n −1)w˜c m −nW˜ )
W˜ 3
,
franchise extension preferences are monotonic in w˜c i . This implies that if the
median enfranchised voter prefers an extension of the franchise, then there is
a majority in favor of franchise extension among the enfranchised.
Suppose, therefore, that we have w˜c i = w˜c m , i.e., that the citizen under
consideration is himself the median voter. We then have that
∂ uc i (w˜c m )
∂ w˜c m

w˜c i =w˜c m
=− (n −1)(w˜c m − W˜∼c )((n −2)w˜c m − W˜∼c )
W˜ 3
, (6)
where W˜∼c :=
∑
k 6=c w˜k m .
In particular, we note that if we have n = 2, the derivative in (6) is negative
(positive) as w˜c m < W˜∼c (w˜c m > W˜∼c ). That is, an incumbent median voter who
11
x ?1 x
′
1
x1
x ′2
x ?2
x2
..........................
...........
.........
........
.....
....
....
....
....
....
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
.................................
...................
...............
............
...........
..........
.........
........
.....
.....
.....
.....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
..
..
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
....
....
....
...
...
....
....
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
....
....
....
...
...
....
....
.....
......
...........
.....................................................................................................................................................................................................
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
...
...
...
....
.....
........
.... ........................... .............................
..
..
..
...
...
...
....
.....
..........
.. ...................
.....................
....... ....... ....... .. ....... ....... ....... ...
....... .... ....... .... ....... ....... ....... ..... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... .
....
...
....
..
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
.
Figure 1: Rational franchise extension.
faces an opponent whose income (adjusted for military production technol-
ogy) is different from his own would want to delegate the spending decision
to somebody whose income is further away from the opponent’s.
Figure 1 illustrates the logic of rational franchise extension in the 2-country
setting. When the original median voter in country 1 is in control, the best-
reply curves intersect at (x ?1 , x
?
2 ). If country 1 extends the franchise so that the
new median voter’s best-reply curve is further to the right, we get a new equi-
librium at (x ′1, x ′2), where country 1’s military capacity is greater than before
and country 2’s smaller. The dotted curves are indifference curves of the orig-
inal median voter of country 2. The new equilibrium sits on a lower indiffer-
ence curve, associated with greater utility for the original median voter. In
effect, country 1’s extension of franchise is a commitment to greater military
spending, which leads the opponent to reduce theirs in return, as their relative
cost of arming is now greater.
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If we have n > 2 and all countries identical, (6) reduces to
− (n −2)(n −1)
n 3w˜c m
< 0,
so that an incumbent median voter faced with several identical opponents
would always want to hand over the reins to somebody with lower income.
More generally, we can conclude the following.
Proposition 2 The current incumbent median voter of country c has a strict
incentive to extend the franchise when we have
w˜c m < W˜∼c and (n −2)w˜c m < W˜∼c .
Notice that while (6) is also negative if we have w˜c m > W˜∼c and (n−2)w˜c m >
W˜∼c , i.e., if we have w˜c m > W˜∼c and n > 2, this cannot happen in an interior
equilibrium. Expressions (4) and (5) imply that in order for xc to be positive in
equilibrium, we must have that
(n −1)w˜c m
W˜∼c + w˜c m
< 1.
If we have w˜c m > W˜∼c , the ratio w˜c m/(W˜∼c + w˜c m ) is strictly greater than 1/2,
so the condition cannot hold. Since we are focusing on interior equilibria, we
therefore ignore this scenario.
Ideally, of course, we should consider the game that results when a group
of countries are allowed to determine the extents of their franchises simulta-
neously, in anticipation of the conflict game to follow. It turns out that not
much can be said in general about this game, however.
The expected equilibrium utility of the current incumbent median voter
in country c , given that the new median voter in each country is some citizen
m ′, is
uc m (w˜c m ′) = wc m +

1− w˜c m ′ n −1
W˜ ′

1− w˜c m n −1
W˜ ′

,
where W˜ ′ :=
∑
c w˜c m ′ . At an interior equilibrium of the simultaneous fran-
chise determination game, we must therefore have that
∂ uc m (w˜c m ′)
∂ w˜c m ′
=
n −1
W˜ ′2

w˜c m

1− w˜c m ′ n −1
W˜ ′

− (W˜ ′− w˜c m ′)

1− w˜c m n −1
W˜ ′

= 0
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for all c , i.e., that
w˜c m ′ =
W˜ ′∼c (n w˜c m − W˜ ′∼c )
W˜ ′∼c + (n −2)w˜c m (7)
for all c . Although uc m is not in general concave in w˜c m ′ , evaluation of the
second derivative at the critical point yields that
∂ 2uc m (w˜c m ′)
∂ w˜ 2c m ′
 ∂ uc m (w˜c m ′ )
∂ w˜c m ′ =0
=− (W˜
′∼c + (n −2)w˜c m )4
8(W˜ ′∼c )3(n −1)2w˜ 3c m < 0,
so we do in fact have optimality.
Beyond (7), not much can be done to further characterize equilibrium fran-
chises. In the following we consider some special cases.
Suppose we have n = 2. In case the countries are identical, neither extends
the franchise. If they are not identical, an interior equilibrium does not exist.
If we have n > 2 identical countries, (7) implies that for each c we have that
w˜c m ′ =
2−n +n 2
n (n +1)
w˜c m < w˜c m .
Hence in this case all countries extend the franchise. The amount of the ex-
tension is declining in the number of countries, and approaches zero as it ap-
proaches infinity, as we have that
lim
n→∞
2−n +n 2
n (n +1)
= 1.
Finally, consider the case of one hegemonic country and n −1 identical other
countries. This case does not allow for an analytic solution in general, but
suppose, as an example, that the adjusted income of the incumbent median
voter in the hegemonic country is .4, and that there are two other countries,
both with adjusted incumbent median voter incomes of .5. In equilibrium,
the hegemonic country then selects a new median voter with adjusted income
approximately equal to .17, and the others each select someone with adjusted
income approximately equal to .48. That is, the hegemonic country extends
the franchise substantially, the others just a little bit.
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4 Historical evidence
A central implication of Propositions 1 and 2 is that a country that has military
technology superior to, and a greater degree of democracy than, its potential
opponents, is hegemonic and has an incentive to extend the franchise. After
such an extension it should have greater military spending and capacity, and
hence greater power. In the following we consider the relationship between
military technology, degree of democracy, military expenditure and franchise
extension of the world’s leading powers from the early 19th century to recent
times.
We divide this time span into four periods of approximately 40 years each.
In each of the four periods we see a positive correlation between degree of
democracy, military technology, military spending, and power, as predicted by
Proposition 1. Moreover, in line with Proposition 2, we observe that franchise
extensions took place in countries with superior military technology and the
most democratic institutions, i.e., countries of hegemonic type. These coun-
tries were, respectively, the United Kingdom for the 1810s–1850s, the United
Kingdom, France, and the United States for the 1860s–1900s, the United States
and the United Kingdom for the 1910s–1940s, and the United States for the
1950s–1980s (see Table 1). In all these countries, franchise extensions led to
even greater military expenditure and power, which reinforced their hege-
monic position.
In the interest of clarity and brevity our discussion will abstract from a se-
ries of structural changes that western nations underwent in the time span
under consideration. Among these urbanization, industrialization, and the
rise of the welfare state are clearly relevant, but perhaps not essential, to our
basic argument. In particular, it is generally acknowledged that throughout
the 19th century income inequality was exceptionally high (although there is
no clear estimate of these trends see, e.g., Milanovic [47]) and public spend-
ing was mostly on the military, while redistribution via public services and the
consequent decline in income inequality is a post-WWII phenomenon.
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Table 1: Countries of hegemonic type
Country 1810s–1850s 1860s–1900s 1910s–1940s 1950s–1980s
France X
UK X X X
USA X X X
Data and methodology We shall always focus on a small number of countries,
from 4 to 8, which we identify as the world’s leading powers of the period con-
cerned. The argument is that, outside of this small league, countries are inac-
tive in international conflict as they take the world’s order as given. We select
leading powers according to their superior military technology. In each of the
four periods, two crucial determinants of military technology are heavy in-
dustry and access to credit. We estimate a country’s heavy industry by its iron
and steel production and its primary energy consumption, while we discuss
access to credit in terms of political influence and competitiveness of credit
markets.8 Secondary determinants of military technology changed over time.
Population size was important for military technology in the early 19th cen-
tury, but became less and less relevant later. The crucial determinant of 20th
century military technology was a safe supply of oil (see Table 2).9 For each
time period, heavy industry, access to credit, population size, and access to
oil jointly determine a country’s military technology in a complex way. For
8These data are from the Correlates of War (COW) data set on National Material Capabili-
ties. Iron and steel production represents a country’s total production of pig iron until 1899,
and of steel from 1900 onwards. It is originally measured in tons. Primary energy consump-
tion represents a country’s total consumption of petroleum, electricity, and natural gas. It is
originally measured in one thousand metric coal-ton equivalents. We instead measure each
these two variables in relative terms, i.e., as a share of the total for all leading powers in the
period concerned. Further details about this and all other data and regression equations used
in the following are available on demand from the authors.
9The data on total population are from the Correlates of War (COW) data set on National
Material Capabilities. Total population is measured in thousands. The data on oil production
are from The Shift Project (TSP) data portal and is measured in millions of tons.
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Table 2: Determinants of military technology
1810s–1850s 1860s–1900s 1910s–1940s 1950s–1980s
Access to credit X X X X
Heavy industry X X X X
Population size X X
Oil supply X X
instance, in the 19th century heavy industry and access to credit were substi-
tutes of population size, as good weapons and fast transportation could com-
pensate for a small population. Oil was not yet relevant. Later, in the 20th cen-
tury, population size lost importance, and oil became the crucial complement
of heavy industry and access to credit due to the progressive mechanization
of warfare.
Information on military expenditure is from the Correlates of War (COW)
data set on National Material Capabilities, measured in British pounds until
1914 and in US dollars afterwards. To estimate a country’s degree of democ-
racy, we report the percentage of its citizens having nominal voting rights, and
discuss various limitations on such rights based on race, sex, age, and so on.
We also look at the country’s average Polity IV index.10 The Polity IV index
is a composite measure of quality of checks and balances on the executive,
openness, competitiveness, and attendance in elections. We use the Polity IV
index to distinguish “real” franchise extensions from purely nominal ones. In
short, a citizen has real voting rights if 1) he is nominally enfranchised, and 2)
his democratically elected representatives have decision power on the bud-
get. Although we do not provide quantitative data on a country’s power, we
extensively discuss this variable in the text. To measure a country’s power, we
consider its colonial domains and its economic/political influence on other
10These data are from the Polity IV Annual Time Series data set. Democracy is measured
by the Polity index on a scale from −10 to 10, where −10 is highly autocratic and 10 highly
democratic.
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Figure 2: Average degree of democracy (Polity IV) and average military expen-
diture (COW) of main actors in world politics for the period 1816–1859.
countries. To estimate increases in a country’s power, we report its victories
in wars and territorial acquisitions.
4.1 The 1810s–1850s
In the 1810s–1850s, the United Kingdom had the best military technology and
the most democratic institutions, and was therefore most likely of hegemonic
type (see Figures 2 and 3). In line with our theory, it extended the franchise
and increased its military expenditure, expanding its power via its colonial do-
mains.
Events The Congress of Vienna of 1815 determined the balance of power of
post-Napoleonic Europe. The leading powers—the United Kingdom, Russia,
Austria, and France—divided the world into spheres of influence (Albrecht-
Carrié [10], Ch. 1). During the period 1815–1853 there were no wars between
these powers, but their competition for world supremacy was greater than
18
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Figure 3: Relative average iron and steel production and primary energy
consumption (COW) of main actors in world politics for the period 1816–
1859. Countries are ordered according to their average degree of democracy
(Polity IV) in the same period.
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ever. The United Kingdom, the most democratic power (see Figure 2), ex-
panded its empire more than anyone else. The period ended with the Crimean
war of 1853–1856, which saw Russia defeated by a coalition of all other pow-
ers.11
Democracy The United Kingdom had had roughly democratic institutions
for a long time, but extended the franchise in this period for the first time
(Evans [26], Ch. 1). More specifically, the British parliament had acquired veto
power on the budget back in 1688, but only very wealthy adult males had ef-
fective access to democratic representation.12 No fundamental democratic
reforms took place in the 18th century. In 1832, however, a liberal government
reformed the voting system and extended the franchise to include about 15%
of adult males (see Evans [26], Ch. 3). Russia and Austria were strongly au-
tocratic (see Figure 2). Serfdom was abolished in Russia only in 1861, and
Austria was the most repressive state in Europe. France was somewhere in
between. Universal male suffrage was introduced during the French Revolu-
tion, but quickly abolished. After Napoleon’s defeat, France had a long period
of mild conservatism which ended only with the revolution of 1848. The rev-
olution brought back universal male suffrage, which was then abolished by
the first democratically elected government. Voting rights were reintroduced
under Napoleon III, but only nominally, as the government was rather author-
itarian (Albrecht-Carrié [10], Ch. 2).
Military In terms of military technology, the United Kingdom was far ahead
of other countries. It was the only power to have developed a modern sys-
tem of public finance, which allowed it to borrow heavily at times of war. It
had the most industrialized economy (see Figure 3), and controlled an em-
pire which guaranteed a steady supply of food, raw materials, and personnel
11Although Austria remained formally neutral, it substantially contributed to the defeat of
Russia (Albrecht-Carrié [10], Ch. 3).
12While this was generally the rule, there were a few exceptions, in particular in places with
the so-called potwalloper suffrage (see, e.g., Brock [14]). In many places, however, elections
were controlled by the local elite and many elections were uncontested.
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Figure 4: Total population (COW) of main powers for the period 1816–1859.
Countries are ordered according to their average degree of democracy (polity
IV) in the same period.
(Brewer [13], Ch. 4). Other powers had rather rural economies, and their em-
pires were not comparable to the British one in economic terms. Their mili-
tary technology was essentially based on their large populations, which were
at least three times that of the British (see Figure 4). The British empire grew
impressively in this period. Besides seizing a number of French and Spanish
colonies as a consequence of Napoleon’s defeat, the United Kingdom firmly
established its control of India, Australia, and New Zealand. It conquered Java,
Singapore, Malacca, Burma, and Hong Kong, and expanded its influence in
China (Albrecht-Carrié [10], Ch. 1 and 2). Other powers did not engage in any
comparable expansion. Russia and Austria clashed in the Balkans in a sort
of cold war. Neither benefited significantly, as the Ottoman Empire was pro-
tected by the British and the French. After much struggle, France conquered
only Algeria. It attempted to conquer Mexico, but failed (Albrecht-Carrié [10],
Ch. 1 and 2).
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Figure 5: Average degree of democracy (Polity IV) and average military expen-
diture (COW) of main actors in world politics for the period 1860–1900.
4.2 The 1860s–1900s
Although not yet comparable to the United Kingdom’s, the military strengths
of France and the United States improved in the 1860s–1900s. (See Figures 6
and 7.) Their power was further magnified in relative terms, as Austria and
Russia lagged behind. The United Kingdom, the United States, and France
were also much more democratic than others, and hence were most likely of
hegemonic type. (See Figure 5.) In line with our theory, they all extended the
franchise and increased their military expenditure, becoming more powerful
and expanding their colonial domains.
Events The Crimean war destabilized the balance of power established at the
Congress of Vienna ([59], Ch. 4). The disagreement between the leading pow-
ers allowed minor ones to grow stronger. Italy, Germany, and Japan unified
their territories in the 1860s–1870s. As a consequence of the rise of Germany
and Italy, Austria lost most of its power. Russia was challenged too, having lost
22
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Figure 6: Relative average iron and steel production and primary energy
consumption (COW) of main actors in world politics for the period 1860–
1900. Countries are ordered according to their average degree of democracy
(Polity IV) in the same period.
23
0.4 0.6 0.8 1
·105
Russia
France
United Kingdom
United States
Italy
Japan
Germany
Austria
Total population
Figure 7: Total population (COW) of main powers for the period 1860–
1900. Countries are ordered according to their average degree of democracy
(Polity IV) in the same period.
the Crimean war and being now severely behind in terms of economic devel-
opment. The decline of Russia became evident with its defeat in the Russo-
Japanese war (Albrecht-Carrié [10], Ch. 3). While autocratic countries were
lagging behind, democratic ones grew stronger, at least in relative terms. The
United Kingdom consolidated its hegemonic status, guaranteed by its control
of the seas via the Royal Navy. France, which had slowly recovered from the
defeat of 1815, reemerged as a true leading power in this period. Their dom-
inant role was, however, increasingly challenged by the United States, which
had become an industrial power and established democracy.
Democracy The main democratic reform of this period was perhaps the de-
mocratization of France, which introduced universal male suffrage in 1875.
While previous reforms were only nominal, this was real, as serious checks and
balances on the executive were put in place (Albrecht-Carrié [10], Ch. 5). The
United Kingdom became more democratic (see Figure 5), as it undertook fur-
ther franchise extensions in 1867 and 1884 which eventually gave voting rights
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to 60% of adult males (Evans [26], Ch. 6 and 8). The United States’s parliament
had substantial power since its foundation in 1789, but only wealthy white
men had voting rights. Property requirements were progressively removed
over time, and roughly all white men in the United States were enfranchised by
the end of the 1860s. Racial limitations to voting rights were formally removed
in 1870 (Keyssar [39], Ch. 8). Russia and Austria remained conservative autoc-
racies (see Figure 5). Germany unified in 1871, after much struggle against
Austria. The new German parliament was elected by universal male suffrage,
but legislation required consent of states’ representatives. As most states had a
very limited suffrage, power remained in the hands of local aristocracies. The
unifications of Italy and Japan were similar to the German. They all reacted to
foreign influence. They engaged in massive economic and social reforms, but
the elite remained firmly in power (Albrecht-Carrié [10], Ch. 5).
Military At the end of the 19th century all powers had acquired modern sys-
tems of public finance. Financial markets had become increasingly compet-
itive in the second half of the century; hence minor powers without politi-
cal influence could borrow freely (Ferguson [29], Ch. 1).13 Military technol-
ogy changed drastically in this period. The development of the railway and
of semi-automatic weaponry allowed relatively small armies to keep large ter-
ritories and populations under control (Grant [33], Ch. 1). This boosted colo-
nization, and all leading democracies engaged in territorial expansions. Since
the reforms of 1875, a series of democratically elected governments led France
into a ruthless colonial campaign, conquering large territories in Africa and
Asia (Albrecht-Carrié [10], Ch. 4). Within a decade France acquired complete
control of Vietnam and Laos, and a number of enclaves in China. Later, it
established colonies also in the South Pacific, including New Caledonia and
French Polynesia. Tunisia became a French protectorate in 1881, and grad-
ually French control grew to encompass most of North, West, and Central
Africa (Albrecht-Carrié [10], Ch. 4). The colonial expansion of the United King-
13This was not the case in the first half of the 19th century, as high finance was essentially
monopolized by the House of Rothschild (Ferguson [28], Ch. 10).
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dom was at least as impressive. In a few decades it conquered Egypt, Sudan,
South Africa, and Rhodesia, and formalized the annexation of India. More-
over, it consolidated its control of the seas, establishing an “informal empire”
which included Argentina, China, and Siam (Albrecht-Carrié [10], Ch. 4). Sim-
ilarly, the United States gained control of Hawaii and a series of former Span-
ish colonies, including Cuba and the Philippines (Zinn [69], Ch. 12). Austria
and Russia, the least democratic countries among the leading powers, did not
achieve major military successes. Their most notable achievements were in
the Balkans, supporting the independence of former Ottoman provinces. Ger-
many, Italy, and Japan, only slightly more democratic, did not significantly ex-
pand their territories (Albrecht-Carrié [10], Ch. 4). The only exceptions were
Japan’s acquired hegemony in Manchuria and Korea, the Italian first conquests
in Libya, and a rather modest German Empire, which included Tanganyka,
Cameroon, Togoland, Samoa, and Micronesia (Albrecht-Carrié [10], Ch. 4).
4.3 The 1910s–1940s
In the 1910s–1940s, the United States and the United Kingdom were the most
established democracies and among the strongest (see Figures 8 and 9), and
hence were arguably of hegemonic type. In line with our predictions they
extended the franchise and increased their military expenditure, expanding
their colonial domains and cementing their dominant positions.
Events The leading powers of this period were roughly the same as the ones
of the late 19th century, but their relative strengths had changed (see Figure
8). The United States had the strongest economy by far. Germany reached
the same industrial levels as the United Kingdom. Russia grew stronger, but
was not an industrial power yet. France lagged behind in terms of industrial
development, while Italy and Japan were catching up, so the economies of
these three became comparable. Thanks to their large empires, however, the
United Kingdom and France maintained a military head start, at least until
WWI (Albrecht-Carrié [10], Ch. 6). As these old powers resisted sharing privi-
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Figure 8: Average relative iron and steel production and primary energy
consumption (COW) of main actors in world politics for the period 1901–
1945. Countries are ordered according to their average degree of democracy
(Polity IV) in the same period.
leges with the emerging ones, their confrontation escalated in two major con-
flicts, WWI and WWII. While the democratic powers were successful in both
wars, most autocratic powers were defeated (Albrecht-Carrié [10], Ch. 7 and
10).
Democracy The United Kingdom and the United States became even more
democratic in this period (see Figure 9). The United Kingdom gave voting
rights to all adult males and around 40% of adult females in 1918, and to all
adult females in 1928. Similarly, the United States extended the franchise to all
adult females in 1920 (Phillips [49], Ch. 1). France remained democratic, but
did not engage in further democratic reforms. After a brief democratic period
between the Russo-Japanese war and WWI, Russia experienced the October
Revolution of 1917 and turned into a totalitarian state. Germany extended
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Figure 9: Average degree of democracy (Polity IV) and average military expen-
diture (COW) of main actors in world politics for the period 1901–1945.
voting rights to all adult women in 1918 and in other ways became increas-
ingly democratic during the 1920s. The rise of National Socialism, however,
quickly reversed these reforms, transforming the country into a totalitarian
state. Women’s suffrage was partially introduced in Italy in 1925. More gener-
ally, Italy became briefly democratic in the 1920s, but then turned totalitarian
in the 1930s. Like Germany and Italy, Japan had a brief period of democracy
in the 1920s, but then became increasingly controlled by the military (Hobs-
bawm [38], Ch. 1 and 2).
Military WWI saw the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy, France, Rus-
sia, and Japan fighting against Germany, Austria, and the Ottoman Empire.
Ideological issues aside, this was a war concerned with the growing ambi-
tions of Germany, and its main prizes were the territories of the declining Ot-
toman Empire (Fromkin [30], Ch. 1). At the end of the conflict all European
powers were exhausted, their economies destroyed and their finances in red.
Conversely, the United States established itself as one of the strongest pow-
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ers. Most European powers held large debts with American banks (Albrecht-
Carrié [10], Ch. 9). The United Kingdom and France were consumed, but their
efforts were generously rewarded. They conquered and shared the Middle
East, with the United Kingdom getting most of it. Austria and Russia, which
had wrestled for Ottoman territories through all the 19th century, were essen-
tially left empty-handed. Moreover, Austria lost all of its empire and Russia
collapsed into a civil war. Germany was stripped of its few colonies, which
were given to the British and the French, and had to pay massive war repara-
tions. Italy and Japan remained largely unrewarded (Fromkin [30], Ch. 38 and
61). Again, democratic countries had gained the most. The nature of warfare
changed rapidly after WWI. Combat vehicles such as warships, submarines,
tanks, and airplanes were developed and improved. Innovation exploded to-
ward the end of the 1930s (Maiolo [43], Ch. 1). As all this new machinery re-
quired combustibles to run, a safe supply of oil became crucial. The United
States and Russia had large oil reserves, and therefore were self-sufficient (see
Figure 10).14
The United Kingdom had acquired exclusive extraction rights in the Mid-
dle East, as a consequence of WWI. France was significantly less well endowed,
but entitled to a share of British oil as a reward for its efforts in WWI. Con-
versely, Germany, Italy, and Japan were essentially dependent on oil imports
from these powers, or from producers under their control (Yergin [66], Ch.
16–19). Thus WWII can be seen as a war of countries with oil (United States,
United Kingdom, France, and Russia) against countries without oil (Germany,
Italy, and Japan).15 Interestingly, three out of four countries with oil were demo-
14While American oil had always been owned by American companies, most Russian oil was
owned by the Swedish Nobels until WWI. Russian oil was then nationalized by the Bolsheviks.
The Nobels managed to sell half of their shares to Standard Oil of New Jersey shortly before
the nationalization. Standard Oil of New Jersey had bet that the revolutionary government
would not last, but turned out to be wrong (Yergin [66], Ch. 6).
15Clearly, as oil was vital to warfare, countries without oil were ultimately defeated. Hitler’s
obsession with conquering the oil-rich Caucasus and the Japanese venture to seize Indone-
sian wells were rather desperate attempts to overcome the issue (Yergin [66], Ch. 16–19).
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Figure 10: Total oil production (TSP data portal) of main oil producers for the
period 1901–1945.
cratic, while all countries without oil were autocratic.
4.4 The 1950s–1980s
The United States and Russia had military technologies significantly superior
to those of all other countries in the 1950s–1980s, and the US was more demo-
cratic. (See Figures 11, 12, and 13.) The United States was therefore of hege-
monic type. As our theory predicts, it extended the franchise and increased
its military expenditure and power.
Events In this period world’s politics were essentially dominated by two su-
perpowers: the United States and Russia (Young and Kent [67], Ch. 1). Their
status was determined by their heavy industry and autonomous oil supplies,
the two key ingredients of military technology. (See Figures 12 and 13.) No
other country had comparable endowments. Western Europe and Japan were
advanced industrialized economies, but lacked a safe supply of oil. Saudi Ara-
bia had enormous oil reserves, but lacked the heavy industry. China gradu-
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ally emerged as an important economic actor, but still played a very marginal
role in world politics. The two superpowers wrestled for half a century, di-
viding the world into spheres of influence. Ultimately Russia collapsed in the
late 1980s, leaving the United States as the unquestioned hegemonic power.
Again, a democracy had won.
Democracy The United States, the United Kingdom, and France remained
strongly democratic (see Figure 11). Moreover, the United States extended
the franchise further in the 1960s–1970s via a series of amendments which
homogenized barriers concerning taxation (1964, 1966), age (1971), and res-
idence (1972) which where particularly restrictive in some states. Germany,
Italy, and Japan, after having experienced totalitarian regimes in the 1930s,
became stable democracies after WWII. These reforms were, however, at least
partially imposed by the winners of WWII. In a similar fashion, France ex-
tended voting rights to women in 1944 by ordinance of the French Committee
of National Liberation. Russia maintained the same totalitarian regime of the
pre-WWII period. The two new emerging powers, Saudi Arabia and China,
were highly autocratic (Hobsbawm [38], Ch. 8).
Military WWII radically changed the world’s balance of power. Germany, Italy,
and Japan were absolutely defeated, and lost their military ambitions. Al-
though formally on the winning side, the United Kingdom and France were
equally ruined. Almost all their colonies rebelled and declared independence
during the 1940s–1960s. Along with the colonies, the United Kingdom and
France lost most of their guaranteed oil supplies (Yergin [66], Ch. 21). Realiz-
ing their own weakness, western European countries (Germany, France, Italy,
and the United Kingdom) started to cooperate more closely, laying the foun-
dations of the European Union. Given the poor state of Europe and Japan, the
United States and Russia emerged as the only military powers. No other coun-
try had both oil and heavy industry in comparable magnitudes (see Figures 12
and 13).
These two powers never fought each other directly, but instigated and sup-
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Figure 11: Average degree of democracy (Polity IV) and average military ex-
penditure (COW) of main actors in world politics for the period 1946–1990.
The data for Western Europe is the sum of military expenditures and the aver-
age degree of democracy of Italy, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom.
32
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
United States
China
Saudi Arabia
Russia
Western Europe
Japan
Iron and steel production Primary energy consumption
Figure 12: Average relative iron and steel production and primary energy
consumption (COW) of main actors in world politics for the period 1946–
1990. Countries are ordered according to their average degree of democracy
(Polity IV) in the same period.
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plied conflicts all around the world to increase their spheres of influence (Young
and Kent [67], Ch. 6). Western Europe and Japan gradually reemerged as lead-
ing industrial economies. Their dependence on oil imports, however, severely
limited their political strength. Saudi Arabia and China emerged as minor
powers in the 1970s. After WWII, Saudi Arabia had quickly become one of
the world’s largest oil producers, but lacking an industrial economy it could
not become a military power. It gained immense political influence, however,
on the United States, Western Europe and Japan by threatening to cut their oil
supplies (Yergin [66], Ch. 29). China had the world’s largest population and,
although far from being industrialized, had a growing economy and an in-
dependent foreign policy. Its true potential would emerge only later, in the
1990s–2000s.
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5 Alternative theories of franchise extension
In this section, we discuss formal theories of franchise extension that have
emerged within the economics literature in the last two decades, examining
them in light of the growing empirical evidence.16
An obvious puzzle that confronts theories of franchise extension that focus
on redistribution arises from observing trends in income inequality in rich
countries. As argued in Piketty [50], income inequality roughly follows a U-
shaped pattern during the 20th century, with a minimum in the 1970s, and has
recently reached levels almost as high as at the beginning. While the decline
in income inequality up to the 1970s is in line with redistributive theories of
democracy, it is hard to reconcile these theories with the steady growth of the
last 40–50 years. So perhaps redistribution is not the characterizing feature of
democracy.
A seminal explanation for franchise extension in 19th century Europe is
put forward by Acemoglu and Robinson [2, 3]. In their model there are two
economic classes, the rich and the poor, and only the rich are enfranchised
initially. Facing a threat of revolution that would expropriate them of their
belongings, the rich extend voting rights to the poor to bribe them out of rev-
olution. The extension of voting rights to the poor prevents revolution as it
is assumed to be a commitment to transfers from the rich to the poor in the
future, when the poor may find it difficult to mobilize and renew the threat of
revolution. Aidt and Franck [6] provide evidence that, between the two na-
tional elections of 1830 and 1831 in England, the highest local vote swings
in support of the Whigs happened in close proximity to riots by agricultural
workers that were partly caused by the poor harvest of 1828. They argue these
riots gave rise to fear of revolution among the enfranchised elite, who hoped
16Here we exclusively focus on the economics literature. We refer to Ziblatt [68] for a sum-
mary of the contributions in political science. Other theories focus on modernization (Prze-
worski and Limongi [52], Gundlach and Paldam [34]), industrialization (Rueschemeyer et
al [54]), inequality (Ansell and Samuels [11]) and political compensation (Congleton [21],
Scheve and Stasavage [56]).
35
that a victory of the Whigs (which promised to extend the franchise to about
15% of the male population, i.e., the upper middle class, as they did in 1832)
would calm rioters and prevent revolution. The authors interpret these facts
as evidence in favor of the theory of Acemoglu and Robinson [2, 3].17 It is not
immediately clear, however, why enfranchising the upper middle class would
bribe agricultural workers out of revolution: what is the gain of the latter?18
Another theory of franchise extension is put forward in Lizzeri and Per-
sico [41], which exclusively concerns 19th century England. In their setting,
an elected government can alternatively focus on redistribution or on provi-
sion of public goods, with provision of public goods more efficient. They show
that, under some conditions, there may be a majority among the enfranchised
that supports the extension of voting rights to the poor, as this leads to a shift
of policy towards public good provision in equilibrium. They explicitly dis-
cuss this result in relation to the provision of health-related public goods at
the municipal level in England (e.g., clean water), arguing that extensions of
voting rights led to higher provision of these public goods. While they con-
sider extensions of voting rights at the national level, however, the provision
of these public goods was determined at the municipal level by locally elected
representatives. In an empirical study of franchise extension and provision of
public goods in 19th century England, Aidt et al [4] show that the extension
of voting rights at the municipal level on average led to lower provision of
health-related public goods within the corresponding municipalities.19 The
17See also Aidt and Jensen [9] for a cross-country study on contagion effects of revolutions
on democratization in neighboring countries. Analogous mechanism are considered in El-
lis and Fender [25], Dorsch and Maarek [24], Dasgupta and Ziblatt [23], Przeworski [51], and
Weyland [65]. We refer to Acemoglu et al [1] for a review of this literature. As their crucial
assumptions about revolution and franchise extension are (in a broad sense) common with
Acemoglu and Robinson [2, 3], our discussion also applies to them.
18The interpretation offered in Aidt and Franck [6] is that franchise extension broke a feared
coalition between urban radical leaders and agricultural workers, but we are offered no evi-
dence in support of this mechanism.
19See also Aidt et al [5], Aidt and Jensen [7] and Aidt and Jensen [8] for cross-country studies
on the effects of franchise extension on public expenditure and taxation.
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basic idea is that within each municipality the upper middle class was less
willing to fund health-related public goods than was the industrial elite, as the
main beneficiaries of these public goods were the industrial workers (whose
health was valuable to their employers, i.e., the industrial elite) while the main
cost-bearers were the upper middle class entrepreneurs (due to the regressive
tax system of 19th Century England). All in all, the evidence in Aidt et al [4]
casts doubts on the explanation for franchise extension put forward in Lizzeri
and Persico [41].
Llavador and Oxoby [42] develop a theory of franchise extension that relies
on the existence of two parties representing the interests of the industrial elite
and the landowners. In their model, under some conditions the party in power
may have an incentive to extend the franchise to workers, and if this party
represents the interests of the industrialists (landowners) we should expect
partial (universal) suffrage. It is noteworthy that in their framework it is the
party in power that unilaterally extends the franchise, while the extension of
voting rights is generally not supported by a majority among the enfranchised.
We believe this is a crucial limitation of their model as in the 19th century
there were no political parties in the sense of today, and due to lack of party
discipline a crucial reform would never pass unless supported by a majority of
MPs across political parties. As discussed in Aidt and Franck [6] in relation to
the Tories or the Whigs of 19th century England, party affiliation was hardly a
predictor of voting behavior in the House of Commons: both Tories and Whigs
were internally polarized on the issues of abolition of slavery and political-civil
rights for Catholics, while the majority of MPs strongly supported protection
of private property and repression of riots independently of party affiliation.
The last theory of franchise extension we consider is due to Ticchi and Vin-
digni [60], who propose an alternative explanation that, like ours, is related
to international conflict. In their model there are two economic classes, the
rich and the poor, and initially only the rich are enfranchised. Facing a mil-
itary threat from a foreign power, the enfranchised elite promises to extend
voting rights to the poor if they fight the war against the foreign power effec-
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tively. Franchise extension is therefore here seen as an incentive provided by
the elite in order for the poor to exert noncontractible effort in war, solving a
moral hazard problem. We believe this story is particularly well-suited to ex-
plaining franchise extensions that gave voting rights to workers and women,
as happened in early 20th century in Europe before and after WWI. On the
other hand, when considering franchise extensions in the early 19th century
the arguments in Ticchi and Vindigni [60] may seem as problematic as the
ones in Acemoglu and Robinson [2, 3]: as voting rights were initially extended
only to the upper middle class (e.g., about 15% of the male population in 1832
England), it is not clear why this franchise extension would motivate working
class soldiers to effectively fight a war.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper we suggest that we owe modern democracy, at least in part, to the
desire on the part of incumbent elites to increase the power of their countries
in international relations under the implicit threat of international conflict.
This insight contrasts with theories such as that of Acemoglu and Robinson [2]
that see franchise extension as the response of elites to threats of insurrection
internal to a nation.
But it also contrasts with a large theoretical literature on democracy that
focuses on its appealing properties as a political system once it is in place (see,
e.g., Dahl [22]), while rarely touching on the issue of why we ever should expect
it to appear, or why it should be stable. There are at least two problems with re-
stricting attention to normatively pleasing aspects of democracy. One is that,
given that a transition from a less inclusive political system to a more inclusive
one is going to remove some privileges originally enjoyed by the incumbent
elite, it is not clear how it could ever happen. Changes do not come about
simply because an outside observer might think them desirable. A second
problem is that losing sight of the outside option makes us unable to explain
deviations from the normative ideal. As pointed out by, e.g., Buchanan [15],
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any stable social contract must make all participants at least as well off as they
would be by defecting from it. That is, the default option of outright conflict
reasonably puts restrictions on what is achievable within a political system.
It is our hope that in this paper we have helped to shed some further light
on the issue of the forces leading to democratization, and on the issue of what
makes democracy stable.
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